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INDUSTRIAL FINANCING IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
BY
JOB ABIODUN OLORUNSHOLA
ABSRACT

This paper reviews institutional arrangements for industrial financing in
Nigeria, especially the development banks and specialised credit-granting agencies/
schemes with direct focus on the industrial sector. The overall conclusions were that
most of these institutions have performed below expectations as most industrial
enterpises in the country have continued to be self -financed. Also these
arrangements have deteriorated further in recent times due to some operational
bottlenecks, including inadequate funding and under- capitalisation, unwieldy
institutional .framework and overlapping offunctions, inadequate staffing and high
cost of operations. Thus, on- going initiatives to streamline the dense institutional
framework for industrial credit delivery through the elimination offunctional
overlaps andfiling ofgaps are steps in the right direction.

INTRODUCTION
The significance of finance in the drive for economic growth is fairly well
established and generally accepted. Availability of adequate financial resources and
acquisition in proper mix of the needed funds by firms from alternative sources are
critical for the success of industrial investment. This is why most industrial
development strategies always incorporate sources of financing for industrial
enterprises so as to ensure optimum performance. Industrial development has
continued to be a major concern of most governments world-wide. The reason for
JOB ABIODUN OLORUNSHOLA is a Principal Economist in the Industrial Studies office,
Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja.
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this is not far fetched. Industrialisation offers prospects of a growing availability of
manufactured goods, increased employment, improved balance of payments, and,
greater efficiency and modernisation throughout the economy. Also, industrialisation
is characterised by high. technological innovations, the development of managerial and
entrepreneurial talents and improvements in technical skills which normally promote
rising productivity. Improvements in living standards, in turn, create growing
demand for manufactured products.
In Nigeria, industrialisation has since independence constituted a major policy
objective of the state. Government's concern and desire to achieve industrial growth
and development have been articulated in many ways, including direct participation,
alone or jointly with private sector interest groups, provision of industrial incentives
and adequate finance. The central goal of government policy was to foster growth.in
the manufacturing sector by channeling funds to the private industrial sector by the
qanking system. Usually, up till October 1996, banks were mandated to finance, at
low interest rates, certain types of investment that were considered of utmost priority
to the economy. In addition, the federal Government has established and continued to
fund development financial institutions and special schemes to boost manufacturing
production. The lending terms of development institutions are usually less stringent
than those ofthe formal banks. There are also other financial arrangements to

enhance

availability of funds for small-scale industrial development throughout the country.
This paper assesses the extent to which these arrangements has affected
industrial financing in Nigeria. Specifically, how has the evolution of industrial
financial institutions influenced the direction of credit to medium to large-scale
industries. How has the establishment of other financial arrangement·helped to channel
credit to small and medium-scale enterprises? What is the industrial financing pattern
in Nigeria? To answer these questions, we use available secondary data of some
financial institutions and Central Bank of Nigeria's annual business survey statistics
'during 1989-1998 period.
The paper is, therefore, divided into five sections. Section two, following the
introduction, discusses some theoretical issues while section three reviews the
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industrial financing institutions in Nigeria. In the fourth section, an appraisal of
business financing in Nigeria is undertaken and some lingering constraints on the
funding arrangements are highlighted. The fifth section summarises the paper and
concludes with some policy recommendations.
2.

SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES

2.1

A Brief Literature Review

There is a large body ofliterature on financing investment projects. Jorgenson
and Siebent ( 1968) for instance, co~pares five alternative theories of inducement to
invest, namely neoclassical I, neoclassical II, accelerator, expected profits and
liquidity. According to Neoclassical I, investors' desire to reap capital gains largely
explain their current investment behaviours. A capital gain is a realised increase in
the monetary value of an asset. Capital gains tend to arise when demand for the asset
exceeds supply over a period of time. Examples of assets on which capital gains
might be expected to acrue are real estate, property, works of art, and stocks and
shares. Neoclassical II investment theory, on the other hand, emphasises that it is the
anticipated long-term real capital appreciation, and not short-term changes in
monetary value of assets, that induce investment spending. According to this theory,
:,

monetary capital gains can and do arise even when there is no secular movement in

..

demand-supply relationships, especially during inflation periods. Capital gains
derived from inflation are, therefore, not necessarily real gains but mere book entry
adjustments. Accelerator theory ofinvestment on the other hand, takes desired capital
to be proportional to output as a possible explanation of investment expenditures.
Expected profits theory of investment suggests that profit expectations can best be
measured by the market value of the firm so that desired capital is proportional to
market value, while the basic premise of the liquidity theory of investment behaviour
is that the supply of funds schedule rises sharply at the point where internal funds are
exhausted. Their main conclusion, therefore, is that since neoclassical I incorporates
capital gains in the price ?f capital services and the cost of capital, ~ereby resulting in
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the least residual variance over all other theories, it should be taken as the best
explanation of investment behaviour. These findings strongly corroborates the
previous results of Grunfeld ( 1960) and Kuh ( 1963 ).
Shapiro (1978), on the other hand, focusses on profits and accelerator
theories as adequate methods of determining investment behaviour of firms. Profits
theory makes total investment depend, in part, on the level of aggregate profits and
therefore on the level of the economy's income. The rationale of the profits theory is
that current profits provide the incentive to acquire the additional capital goods that
will provide the greater output from whose sales those greater future profits will be
generated. On its part, accelerator theory relates the rate of investment spending to
changes in the level of output. The relationship between the growth of output and the
level of net investment is called the accelerator principle since it suggests that an
increase in the growth rate of output - an acceleration - is needed to increase the level
of investment. From this point of view, investment is explained largely on a physical
or input-output basis; increase in the desired capital stock occur because a growing
demand for output necessitates a growing supply of the services of capital goods. It
should be noted, however, that the accelerator relationship may not hold if the economy
is operating with substantial excess plant capacity, that is, at a low
capacity-utilization rate . In this case, the actual capital stock is greater than
equilibrium, so that an increase in output c::in raise the equilibrium capital stock up
toward the actual existing stock, with little effect on net investment
No single investment theory can reasonably apply to all forms of investment
expenditure. However, for the purpose ofindustrial financing, there are two basic and
critical determinants of the level of net investment spending: the expected rate of net
profit which businesses hope to realise from investment spending and the rate of
interest. The level of investment spending is usually guided by the profit motive, as
the business sector buys capital goods only when it expects such purchases to be
profitable. On the other hand, the level of interest rate, the cost of obtaining the
money capital required to negotiate the purchase of real capital is the other
complementary variable of interest. At any point in time, business firm~, on the
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aggregate, have a wide variety of investment projects under consideration. If interest
rates are high, only those projects with the highest expected rate of net profits will be
undertaken. As the interest rate is lowered, projects whose expected rate of net profits
is less will also become commercially feasible and the level of investment will rise.

In general, given the net expected rate of profits from all possibl~ investment projects,
there will be an inverse relationship between the interest rate and the level of
investment spending.
2.2

Major Sources of Funds
The financing of an industrial enterprise may be categorised broadly as

internal and, or external financing, depending on the sources of funds employed.
Internal financing embraces the internal generation of funds to meet an enterprises
capital requirements. It may involve one, all, or a combination of the following: the
retention of profits, reserve capitalisation, temporary utilization of unpaid dividends,
depreciation or sale of assets. External financing, on the other hand, con-notes the
utilization ofresources external to the enterprise and are generally grouped into short,
intermediate and long-term financing.
Short-term credit is defined as debt originally scheduled for repayment within
one year. Three major sources of funds within short maturities are easily identifiable,
namely trade credit between firms, loans from commercial banks and commercial
papers. Trade credit, represented by accounts payable, is the largest single category
of short-term credit and is especially important for smaller firms. Trade credit is a
spontaneous source of financing in that it arises from ordinary business transactions;
as sales increases, so does the supply of financing from accounts payable. Bank
credit, on the other hand, occupies a pivotal position in the short-term money market.
Banks provide the marginal credit that allows firms to expand more rapidly than is
possible through any other short-term financing. This is by way of over-draft facility,
usually required for working capital needs of firms. If an overdraft is arranged, a
limit is set to which the bank's customer can overdraw his current account, the
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balance varying from day to day transactions while the borrower only pays interest on
the sum overdrawn. Commercial paper consists of promissory notes of large firms
and is sold primarily to other business firms, insurance companies, pension funds,
banks, etc. Maturities of commercial paper vary from two to six months, with
generally lower interest rates well below those on prime business loans. The use of
the open market for commercial paper is usually restricted to a comparatively small
number of concerns that are rated to be exceptionally credit worthy.
Intermediate-term financing is defined as debt originally scheduled for
repayment in more than one year. The major forms of these groups of financing
include terms loans, conditional sales contracts and lease financing. A term loan is a
business credit with a maturity of more than one year but less than 15 years. There
are except_ions to the rule, but ordinarily term loans are retired by systematic
repayments over the life of the loan. Commercial banks and life insurance companies
are the principal suppliers of term lo~ credit. Conditional sales contracts, on the
other hand are used to finance a substantial portion of the new equipment purchased
by business firms. Under this method, the buyer agrees to buy a particular piece of
equipment and to pay for it instalmentally over a one-to-five year period. Until
payment is completed, the seller of the equipment continues to hold title to the
equipment. While the contract is being paid off, the purchaser has possession of the
equipment and uses it in his business. What we have, in effect, is a medium-term
accounts receivable financing arrangement. One way of obtaining the use of facilities
and equipment is to buy them, but an alternative is to lease rather than own. Lease
financing involves the acquisition of the economic use of an assets through a
contractual commitment to make periodic lease payments to a lessor who owns the
asset. Leasing can involve the direct acquisition of an asset under a lease, a sale and
leaseback arrangement whereby the firm sells an asset it owns and leases it back from
the buyer, or a leveraged lease. Because of its contractual obligation, leasing is
regarded as a method of financing similar to borrowing.
Equity capital constitutes the main source of long-term financing for an
enterprise. It is the first source of funds to a new business and the base of support for
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existing firms' borrowings. This form of capital is normally raised either by public
or private issuance of shares usually with fluctuating returns or preference shares
with fixed rate of profit. Company's capital base can be expanded further through
conversion of reserves into bonus shares or the issue of 'rights' shares to existing
shareholders. Apart from equity capital, other long-term sources offinance is through
the issuance of debt securities like debentures and bonds by companies
(often approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission and saleable on the
stock market). A debenture is a document setting out the terms of a loan, usually
held by a trustee on their behalf. On the other hand, a bond is a long-term promissory
note issued as a means of raising money. Most bonds are redeemable and carry a
fixed rate of interest.
There are diffe~ent costs and risks incurred by the firm in using each of these
sources. The funds that are lowest in cost to the firm are those derived from the first
source, internal funds. The cost of using these funds for investment purposes is the
opportunity cost, measured by the rate that the firm could otherwise earn by putting
these funds into securities. If the firm does not want to take the risks of purchasing
the stock, the appropriate rate is the rate it would earn on the purchase of debt issues
of other firms or of the government. Because firms that are not in the lending
business will usually have to pay a higher rate as borrowers than they can receive as
lenders, the implicit cost to them of internal funds will be less than the cost of
external funds secured by borrowing. The cost of equity funds, on the other hand, is
greater than the cost of borrowed funds for a number of reasons, one of the most
important being the differential tax treatment of interest and dividends. The firm's
interest payment are deductible in arriving at taxable income; its dividends payments
are not. A factor of a quite different nature that helps to explain the higher cost of
equity - financing is.an imputed cost in the form of dilution of an existing group's
control that results from an increase in the number of shares outstanding other than
through right issue.
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Industrial Financing in Nigeria: Evidence from CBN Surveys
Using the results of annual business surveys of the CBN, we provide some

information on the emerging pattern of investment financing in the manufacturing
sub-sector. Usually, four alternative sources of funds for investments, namely, bank
loans, company's own funds, foreign sources and equity capital are provided out of
which respondents were expected to indicate how their investment expenditures have
been funded. Available statistics show that heavy reliance was placed on internally
generated funds,. with average rate of self-financing at about 66.2 per cent between
1989-1998. The next major source of finance was bank loans, accounting for about
24.4 per cent.of total funds invested, followed by equity capital and funds from
foreign sources which accounted for 6.6 and 2.8 per cent, respectively for the period
under review (see CBN annual reports).
Many firms rely on internally generated funds because of its obvious
advantages over other sources of business finance. For instance, this source is cheap
as no real price is paid to acquire the funds and there is little or no formalities

attached

to the conversion of retained profits for use by firms. Furthermore, unlike in the case
of bank loans and other sources, there is no need to enter into covenants -with anyone
for internally generated funds. The observed high rate of self-financing it however,
not peculiar but generally in agreement with theoretical and empirical expectations.
The vast majority of firms usually strive to obtain their funds from internal sources
and the extent of dependence on external funds is normally small and carefully
monitored.

3.

INDUSTRIAL FINANCING INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA

3.1

Historical Antecedents
Prior to independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy was mainly agrarian,

both in production for domestic consumption and exports. Industrialisation was not
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part of the colonial economic policy which was anchored on making the colonies
producers of primary raw materials for foreign industries and importers of
manufactures. Therefore,.the task the first indigenous administration set for itself on
attainment of independence was how to transform Nigeria into a modem industrial
economy and this was embraced by successive governments.
Right from the First National Development Plan (I 962-1968), rapid
industrialisation was given high priority in Nigeria's development plans and goals. In
particular, the Plan was designed to promote growth by laying foundation for future
expansion of productive activities. Government was cognisant that a large volume of
financial resources must be allocated to the productive sectors of the economy,
especially the industrial sector. It wanted Nigerians to participate, to a greater extent,
in the ownership, direction, control and management of a large proportion of the
Nigerian industry. Through the adopted import-substitution industrialisation strategy, the country continued to witness the initiation and vigorous pursuit of policies
and provisions of a wide range of incentives to stimulate the private inciustries and
other businesses, including protection from competing imports immediately after
independence.
Government, however, noted the inadequate private capital for investments
and shortage of institutions specialising in the provision of long-term capital for
industry. lt,therefore, provided investment funds for direct participation in industrial
projects considered to be of natural or strategic importance to the economy. In
addition, government encouraged partnership business ventures between indigenous
private investors with either government or overseas investors. Also, government has
evolved institutional support for the financing of the industrial sector over the years to
promote both large, medium and small-scale industries through the banking industry
as well as through special schemes.
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To facilitate credit supply to the productive sectors so as to accelerate thei.r
growth and development, government established a number of development banks as
from 1964. Development banks are special financial institutions established to fill the
financing gaps left by short and medium term lenders like the commercial and
merchant banks. Two of these development banks have direct focus on the industrial
sector. They are: The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) and the
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI).
(a)

Nigerian Industrial Development Bank
The NIDB was established in 1964. It emerged as a result of the

re-structuring of the Investment Corporation of Nigeria (ICON).

The corporation

(ICON) was established as a private long-term finance institution in 1959 with
foreign equity interest. The functions ofNIDB include to:
(i)

provide medium and long-term finance for public and private
enterprises;

(ii)

influence the supply of bankable projects by engaging in project
promotion and development activities;

(iii)

provide information to local and foreign entrepreneurs on investment
possibilities and prospects;

(iv)

bring indigenous entrepreneurs in contact with foreign technical
experts and finance for joint ventures;

(v)

provide supervisory and post-investment advisory services to
beneficiaries of its funds;

(vi)

assist the development of the capital market by:
- encouraging prospective and existing clients to incorporate as
public companies and seek quotation on the stock exchange; and
taking up or offering to take (underwriting) shares in such
companies; and
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(vii)

channel investment resources from international financial
institutions, like the World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation, into productive investments in Nigeria.

(b)

Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI)
NBCI was established in 1973 as a specialised development bank and

was supposed to be the main avenue for the governmen's efforts to channel funds to
small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs). The main functions of NBCI, as
specified in the Act establishing it, include the provision of equity capital and funds
by way ofloan to indigenous persons; institutions and organisations for medium and
long-term investments in industry and commerce; the performance of all aspects of
merchant banking and the conduct of other banking and commercial business as
deemed appropriate; and the purchase and sell of stocks quoted on the Stock
Exchange as well as provide guarantee, including letters of credit.
Beside the NIDB and NBCI, there are other development agencies at

.

State levels especially the States' investment corporations that also cater for
channeling public funds for industrial development.

3.2.2

Monetary and Credit Guidelines by the CBN
The CBN has been particularly concerned in ensuring that the industrial sector

is adequately funded. Arisisng from the fact that banks tend to concentrate heavily
on short-term, self-liquidating loans to finance foreign and domestic trade, while
neglecting medium to long-term loans to industry and other productive sectors, credit
control policies were instituted by the CBN to direct funds to priority areas. ~ince
1969, when it was first introduced, sectoral credit allocation guidelines were
therefore stipulated for preferred and less-preferred sectors for both commercial and
merchant_banks to follow in channeling their loan portfolios. The loans to the
preferred sectors are minima in the sense that the banks can exceed the stipulated
proportions while loans to the less-preferred sectors are maxima, indicating that banks
must not exceed the stipulated proportions. In the case of industrial enterprises,
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especially large-scale ones, commercial banks were to grant a minimum of 35 per
cent, while merchant banks were to grant not less than 40 per cent of their total credit.
From early 1980s, the CBN .switched focus to SMEs financing in order to .
alleviate the financial constraint on the sub-sector. Similarly, CBN in the past has,
through monetary policy, attempted to facilitate credit supply to small and
medium-scale enterprises in the country. For instance, in the 1979/80 fiscal year, the
Bank directed that at least 10 per cent of banks' total loans and advances outstanding
be granted to wholly Nigerian-owned SMEs. The proportion was upgraded to 16 per
cent from April 1980 to end-DecembeF, l 9.89 and to 20 per cent from January 1990
up till 1993 when it was dropped, following the adoption of indirect approach to
monetary management. However, in the monetary, credit, foreign trade and
exchange policy guidelines for the year 2000, the Bank, under the aegis of the
Bankers' Committee, reached an agreement with the banks to set aside 10 per cent of
their profit before tax for the financing and promotion of small-scale industries in
response to the less than satisfactory performance of the various SMEs schemes in
the country. The bank' assistance would be in the form of equity participation and
long-term financing, project monitoring, advisory services and nurturing of specific
industries to maturity. The modalities for implementing the current initiatives are
still being worked out.
3.2.3

Other Initiatives on SMEs Financing
Recognising that credit is a critical element in the promotion of SMEs and

also in view of the reluctance of the traditional financial industry to support the sector,
Government initiated other financial arrangements to enhance availability of funds for
the development of SMEs throughout the country. These include the following:
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Specialised Credit-granting Organs and Banks
(i)

Small Scale Industries Credit Scheme (SSICS):
The Federal Government, in 1971, started to provide a more direct

form

of financial assistance to SMEs and set up a small industriesdevelopment

programme to provide technical and financial support to the sector. Specifically, it
established the small industries credit committee to administer, throughout the
country, the small scale industries credit scheme (SSICS). The scheme which
operated as a matching grant between the Federal and State Governments, was
designed to make credit available in liberal terms to SMEs and micro enterprises and
was managed by the States' Ministries of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives through
the Loan Management Committees (LMCs). The SSIC which was meant to be a
revolving loan scheme. However, it became progressively starved of funds, owing
to numerous abuses such that it had to be discontinued in 1979. The NBCI was set up
in its place to fund SMEs.
(ii)

The National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND)
The National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) was set

up by Decree No. 25 of 1988 as a funding mechanism aimed at bridging the gap
in the provision of local and foreign funds to SMEs. The main focus of
NERFUND is the provision of soft, medium to long term funds for wholly
Nigerian-owned small and medium-scale enterprises in manufacturing and
agro-allied enterprises, mining, quarrying, industrial support services, equipment
leasing and other ancillary projects. The resources of NERFUND are mainly
contributions from the Federal Government, the CBN and foreign sources, including
the US$50 million loan from the government of former Czechoslovakia and the US$230
million from the ADB.
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Export Stimulation Loan (ESL)
The export stimulation loan scheme (ESL) is another source of credit

which is available to SMEs. The scheme is designed to assist export oriented
activities.

In the course of sourcing funds for

NERFUND, the Federal

Government obtained an export stimulation loan of 180 million Units of Account
(UA), equivalent of about US$245 million, from the African Development Bank (ADB).
The ESL scheme, which was established by the Export Incentives De~ree 18 of
1986, extends credit to SMEs which p~oduce goods and services for export. A
component of the ESL scheme is the foreign input facility (FIF) through which
exporters can obtain necessary foreign exchange to import inputs for production.

(iv)

The Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SME II)
Apex Unit Loan Scheme
In order to further expand ~redit delivery to SMEs, the CBN and

Federal Ministry of Finance in 1988, negotiated and obtained financial assistance
from the World Bank to complement other sources of funding the SMEs. The total
project cost is $451.8 million of which the World Bank provided $270 million or 64
per cent. Entrepreneurs are expected to provide $79.7 million or 19.2 per cent of the
project, while participating banks (PBs) are expected to provide the balance of$66. l
million. The CBN established an SME Apex Unit in the Banking 1990 to administer
the credit components and other related activities for the World Bank loan in order to
facilitate project implementation. The SME II loan scheme was, however, reduced
to US$ l 42 million in 1992 and finally wound up in March 1994 due largely to the
slow rate of draw-down.
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(v)

The People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN)
The People's Bank was established in 1989 to provide an alternative

accommodation to micro enterprises which had been denied credit by existing
institutions and programmes. The bank is fashioned in line with the Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh" which was estab!ished with the objective of uplifting the
socio-economic conditions ofthe poor through the provision of financial assistance to
micro enterprises so as to obviate need for collaterals which had posed serious
hindrance to most micro entrepreneurs. The bank took off with a grant of~ 230
million as equity capital. In its lending programme, it does not ask for collateral but
collects a service charge of 5 per cent. People's Bank loans are given out on the basis
of group membership in order to ensure prompt repayment. This is because people
within such groups relate one to another and they are jointly and severally held
responsible for the repayment of the loan.
(vi)

Community Banks (CDs)
The Community banking scheme was introduced in 1990 as a vehicle

for self-development. A community bank is a unit bank owned and managed by its
community or group of communities for providing deposits, credit, banking and other
financial services to its members on the basis of self-recognition and credit
worthiness. It, therefore, de-emphasises the need for collateral securities as done by
conventional banks. The community banking scheme's objectives include enhancing
the rapid development of productive activities, especially in the rural areas as well as
improving the economic status of small-scale producers both in the rural and urban
areas. They are also, among others, to operate equipment leasing facilities designed

to ensure the access of its customers to needed inputs.
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Second-Tier Securities Market (SSM)

As the main Stock Exchange caters for large businesses, the
Second-tier Securities Market (SSM) was introduced in 1985 to provide a medium
for SMEs to raise some of their equity funds. In order to participate, an enterprise
must be registered as a public limited company and must have at least a hundred
shareholders. In addition, other less stringent requirements than those for the first
window of the Stock Exchange, also exist and must be fulfilled. The admission fee
into the SSM is onl)#2,000.
4.

TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL FINANCING IN NIGERIA

In this section an attempt is made to assess the contribution of the various
institutional arrangements towards the financing ofthe industrial sector ofthe economy
in the recent past.

4.1

Highlights of Contributions
(a)

CBN

The CBN has continued to play a leading and catalytic role in chanelling
credit to the industrial sector through its guidelines to the banks. In this regard, bank
-intermediated credit to the sector has improved significantly particularly following
the financial reforms of the mid-l 980s. For instance, the volume of banking credit to
manufacturing increased steadily fro~3 .0 billion in 1981 t~5.5 billion,#15.4
billion anclit-82.8 billion in 1986, 1991 and 1997, respectively, indicating improved
financial intermediation in the economy, in response to higher interest rates.
Similarly, credit to manufacturing as a proportion of total banking credit, which was
only 14.1 and 16.l per cent between 1981-1986 and 1987-1995 periods, rose to 32.1
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per cent between 1996 and 1997 (Table 1). The enhanced flow of financial resources
to the manufacturing sector, however, fell short of the official expectations. Table Il
reveals that, with the exception of 1993, commercial banks' loans and advances to the
manufacturing sector deviated persistently from prescribed minima both before and
after deregulation. The deviation or non-compliance rates averaged 6.5 and 3.5 per
cent for the 1981-86 and 1997-96 periods, respectively.
CBN's efforts at chanelling credit to SMEs and micro enterprises through its
guidelines to the banks have also resulted in expanded credit to the sector. Although
prior to 1986, these guidelines appeared not to have had appreciable effect on lending
to these enterprises, this situation changed in the post 1986 period. As a result of
imposition of greater sanctions by the CBN, including mandatory transfer oflending
shortfalls by defaulting banks to the Bank for onward transfer to the relevant
sub-sector, most commercial and merchant banks complied with CBN directives,
leading to credit expansion to SMEs and micro enterprises. For instance, CBN reports
show that banks' loans and advances to these enterprises rose from #102.1 million
in 1980 to ~,900 million and =M-40,344.3 million in 1990 and 1997, respectively.
This represented 1.5, 22.9 and 16.0 per cent of total bank loans and advances for
those years, respectively. Sectoral credit allocation to preferred sectors was discontinued in October, 1996, following the liberalisation of the financial sector.
(b)

NIDB
In keeping with its mandate to accelerate Nigeria's industrial development

through the provision of term· loans, equity finance and technical assistance to
industrial enterprises, NIDB 's orientation has been developmental and has made some
contributions over the years. It has made considerable impact in terms of long-term
loans (sanctions and disbursement), employment generation, industrial dispersal and
promotion of indigenous entrepreneurship. For instance, between 1988 and 1991,
NIDB's sanctioned aboutW.L5 billion for various projects. Total sanctions in 1992
and 1993 stood at :wt .2 bfllion and =N .1 billion, respectively, before crashing tOW-0.6
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million in 1994 and a meagre :N:64,500 in 1998. Similarly, the bank's disbl.lf3ements
which was onl~220,600 in 1990, peaked at =W=l .3 million in 1992, but thereafter
decreased progressively to about# 436,000 in 1995 and#85,300 in 1998 (Tables
III & IV). Among the manufacturing sub-groups that.have benefited from this limited
disbursement of funds were the textiles, food, electronics and electrical appliances,
chemicals and petroleum products, rubber, paper products and metal fabrication.
Although NIDB was established mainly to provide credit and other assistance
to medium and large-scale enterprises, small-scale enterprises with total and working
capital ofup to#750,000 have also been accommodated by the bank. For instance,
NIDB was responsible for the bulk of credit delivery to SMEs under SME II loans
scheme, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the total number of disbursements
under the scheme.
(c)

SSICS
This scheme was largely unsuccessful because of the dearth of executive

capacity to appraise, supervise and monitor projects. Consequently, many unviable
projects were funded which led to massive loan repayment default. The SSICS which
was meant to be a revolving loan scheme became progressively starved of funds such
that it had to be discontinued in 1979 and the NBCI was set up in its place to fund
SMEs.
(d)

NBCI
As the main Federal Government organ for SME credit provision, the NBCI

approved a total of 979 projects amounting to #965 .5 million between 1973 and
1989 and disbursed #141.8 million between 1981 and 1988. Projects in several
sub-groups were covered, including textiles, paper products, etc. Also, NBCI
financed a total of 126 projects under the World Bank Loan Scheme I. Nevertherless,
many others were cancelled for failure of project sponsors to contribute their

1
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counterpart fundings. The NBCI has, however, suffered major problems culminating
in a state of insolvency in 1989. In order to reinvigorate the bank, proposals are
currently on to merge NBCI with NIDB and NERFUND.
(e)

NERFUND
NERFUND has, since its inception in 1989, granted loan approvals and

disbursed funds to a number of projects spread across the country. For example, from
a modest 5 in 1989, NERFUND's approval rose steadily to 67 in 1993 and peaked at
138 in 1995, before declining to 31 and 2 in 1997 and 1998, respectively (Table V).
Similarly, NERFUND has disbursed funds to projects, either in naira or in foreign
currencies, or both according to the sources or funds available and the requirements of
eligile enterprises or projects. From *34.6 million in 1990, total amount disbursed
rose to *122.2 million in 1993. Thereafter, it fell to * 52.4 million and* 4 7. 7
million in 1995 and 1996, respectively before picking up ta* 80.3 and * 104.8
million in 1997 and 1998, respectively. On the other hand, amount of dollars
disbursed to projects was about $115.0 million between 1992 and 1995 while only
about $30.3 million was disbursed between 1996 and 1998. The manufacturing subgroups most favoured by NERFUND's disbursements were the food, beverages and
tobacco, chemical products, wood and furniture and textiles (Table VI).
(f)

SME II Loan Scheme
The SME Apex Office at CBN (Managers of the SME II Loan Scheme)

approved a total of211 projects for US$132.8 million between 1990 and end-March
1994 when projects approval closed. Total disbursement of US$ I 07. I million as at
June, 1996 resulted in the establishment of 85 new SMEs and the expansion,
diversification and modernisation of about 102 existing ones.
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(g)
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Community Banks
By the end of 1998, there were 1,014 functioning Community banks with

loans and advances to beneficiaries amounting to *1 .9 billion. Community banks'
credit to manufacturing micro enterprises was* 129.6,*175.3 and ~45.2 million
in 1993, 1996 and 1998, respectively.
(h)

People's Bank
The People's Bank has so far disbursed over *400 million as loans· and

advances to over 650,000 people engaged in micro enterprises such as metal works,
shoe making, etc.
(i)

Second-Tier Securities Market (SSM)
The number of SMEs listed on the Second-Tier Securities Market (SSM) rose

to 16, 19 and 20 in 1990, 1991 and 1995, respectively. At least, 4 SMEs have moved
to the main list of the market, reflecting an increasing use of the capital market by the
SMEs to raise funds for expansion and modernisation.

4.2

Major Constraints on the Institutions/Schemes
Notwithstanding these limited approvals and disbursements, the performance

of these financial institutions or schemes are far from optimal. Moreover, the
declining trends observed in their activities, emanated from some inhibitive factors
which have hampered their operations and limited their outreach and sustainability.
This, in turn, has contributed, in no small way, to the inadequate funding and poor
performance of the industrial sector of the economy, as manifested by gross
under-utilisation of installed capacities of business enterprises over the years. Some
of the problems are peculiar to institutions while others are general. These include:
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(i)

Poor Funding and Under-Capitalisation
Most of the development banks and schemes do not have sufficient equity.

They have also not been able to effectively mobilise small savings. Many ofthem rely
on government subvention for their funds. Subvention from government cannot be a
continuous practice as it is expected that these agencies would grow to a state when
they would be able to sustain their operations. The capital position of these
institutions have been undoubtedly left to vary, depending on the disposition of
government.
(ii)

High Rate of Loan Default
Because of poor loan appraisal, monitoring, incidence of diversion and

absence of collaterals for small loans, a large percentage of the loans by these
agencies is not repaid as and when due. This not only depletes the volume ofloanable
funds at the disposal of these institutions but serves as a disincentive to further
lending. Consequently, large provisiorn; for bad and doubtful debts have had to be
made, from year to year.
(iii)

Inadequate Infrastructure
Infrastructure, such as roads, water, electricity and communications,

especially in the rural areas, are inadequate. This has hampered the activities of both
the operators of the schemes and their clientele.

(iv)

Unwieldy Institutional Framework and Overlapping of Functions
Too many institutions have been created in the past with overlapping

functions. Many of the institutions appear to have operated at cross purposes. For
instance, the establishment ofthe NERRJND seemed to have adversely affected NBCI's
operations.

0/orunsho/a

(v)
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Inadequate Staffing
There is inadequacy of professional staff and this has, to an extent, affected

efficient loan administration. Some development institutions spend a lot of the funds
in building sophisticated edifices, instead of employing relevant categories of
personnel. This affects the use of resources available to them.

(vi)

High Cost of Operations
Most government-owned credit agencies are high-cost producers, as they carry

huge administrative and operational expenses in relation to their loan portfolios.

5.

SUMMARY AND POLICY PROPOSALS

5.1

Summary

In this paper, an attempt has been made to review existing arrangements for
industrial financing in Nigeria. In this regard, government efforts in the past at
establishing schemes and development financial institutions directed at the i11dustrial
sector were investigated. Also the contributions of the private sector especially the
banks, as facilitated by the CBN, were highlighted.

It was noted that there is an array of institutional arrangements that
government has put in place over the years to provide financial support for industrial
enterprises. These include: NIDB which was set up in 1964 to facilitate industrial
credit delivery; CBN's efforts at influencing the banking system's credit for
industrial financing through mandatory credit allocation guidelines and other
assistance principally to medium and large-scale enterprises, and NBCI which came
into existence in 1973 as the apex financial institution for small businesses. Other
financing initiatives particularly directed towards the SMEs include provisions of the
monetary and credits guidelines of the CBN since 1979/80 fiscal year and up till the
latest one, which persuaded banks to accommodate SMEs financing in their
operations; and establishment ofspecialised credit-granting agencies/schemes to foster
the development of SMEs. These include the erstwhile small-scale industries credit
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scheme (SSICs), managed by the States' Ministries of Industry, Trade and
Cooperatives and which was meant to be a revolving loan scheme but became
increasingly starved of funds as a result of massive loan repayment defaults; the
NERFUND which was established in 1988 to provide soft, medium to long term
funds for wholly Nigerian-owned SMEs in manufacturing and agro-allied enterprises
both in local and/or foreign currency, depending on the funds available to NERFUND
and the need of the project being funded; the SME II World Bank loan of 1988 which
was domiciled in the CBN and finally wound up in early 1994; the Peopl's Bank,
established in 1989 to uplift the socio-economic conditions of the poor through the
provision of financial assistance to micro enterprises without collateral; and
Community Banks which were introduced in 1990 to enhance the rapid development
of productive activities

especially in the rural areas as well as to improve the

economic status of small-scale producers both in the rural and urban areas.

The

paper also highlighted the heavy reliance of internally generated funds among firms
in Nigeria and the contributions of financial institutions to industrial financing in the
country. The performance of most of these institutions over the years has been scanty
and far below expectation. Also, most development financing institutions and other
financing schemes have deteriorated, with most of them drastically reducing or
stopping operations in the past few years due to certain lingering constraints. These
problems include poor funding and under-capitalisation as most of them still rely
mostly on government subvention; high rate of loan default which depletes the volume of loanable funds; weak
multiplicity of institutional

supporting infrastructural facilities; unwieldy and

framework which sometimes lead to over-lapping of

functions; inadequate staffwhich lead to inefficient utilization of resources; and high
cost of operations.
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5.2
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Policy Recommendations
To stem the deterioration and enhance the perfonnance of all .the industrial

financing agencies so as to boost credit supply to the nation's industrial sector, certain
remedial measures must be taken urgently by the government in collaboration with
the private sector. Such policy proposals must address the following broad issues:

(i)

Streamlining Existing Institutional Framework

The multiplicity of institutions that evolved over the years as the off-shoot of
the deliberate attempt at ensuring the flow of finance to industrial

enterprises in

Nigeria must be coordinated, harmonised and streamlined. The proposed merger of
the NIDB, NBCI and NERFUND is, therefore, a right step in the desired direction.
It is recommended that the institution to be created from these establishments should
operate as conglomerate with three subsidiaries such that one would cater for the
financing of large enterprises, another to handle SMEs financing on concessionary
terms, while the third should operate on commercial basis, including deposit taking
and provision of working capital facilities to all establishments irrespective of their
scale of operations.
(ii)

Provision of Adequate Funding
To ensure adequate funding, the private sector should be allowed

equity participation on the industrial financing agencies. Such agency should also
be well capitalised as a solid support for credit administration.
(iii)

Creating Additional Incentives for Industrial Financing
There is also an urgent need to facilitate credit supply to the industrial

sector through appropriate policies that would be attractive to both borrowers and
lenders. Towards this end, an Industrial Credit Guarantee Scheme, the corollary of
the existing Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme should be fashioned out to boost
the lending morale of the banks and also to guarantee repayment of advances as and
when due by reducing the risks involved. Also, government should make industrial
financing profitable to banks and other financial institutions through the introduction
of special rediscount facilities and fiscal incentives.
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(iv)

Creating and Sustaining Conducive Investment Climate
The nation's deteriorated stock of economic and social infrastructure

should be refurbished so as to reduce cost of operations for the credit institutions as
well as their clients. Also, the capacity of the Nigerian Police Force to combat crime
and crisis should be stepped-up through adequate provision of equipment and
generous incentives. Adequate and efficient infrastructure as well as effective
administration oflaw and order are necessary conditions for meaningful investment.

'(v)

Enhancing Capital Market Operations

In addition, appropriate policies to support the capital market must be
pursued vigorously with a view to making it a veritable source of industrial financing.
This will inclu_d e the institution of a continuing well-packaged enlightenment
programme to dissuade investors from their tendency to buy and keep securities
perpetually. Moreover, the programme to deregulate the capital market in Nigeria
should be fully implemented and all inhibitive listing requirements on the Nigerian
Stock Exchange should be rescinded to engender adequate intermediation.
(vi)

Evolving and Promoting Venture Capital
In addition, a long-term strategy should include the introduction of

incentives to promote the evolution ofnew and non-conventional sources of investible
funds, particularly venture capital. Venture capital allows

entrepreneurs to build

and expand firms without having to borrow and pay high interest charges before they
generate any revenues, let alone profits. This source, if promoted, would encourage
technological innovations and ensure adequate finance for high risk enterprises

hitherto discriminated against by banks and other finance houses.
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CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, there has been deliberate attempts by the government at
ensuring the flow of finance to the nation's industrial sector. However, the dense and
uncoordinated institutional framework for industrial credit delivery must now be
streamlined by eliminating functional overlaps and filling of existing gaps within the
system. Also, there is the need for government to involve the private sector fully in
the current initiatives and emerging options to ensure continued availability and
sustainability of credit facilities to boost the country's industrial development. The
on-going privatisation/commercialisation drive should, therefore, provide the needed
impetus to evolve a functional and self-sustaining arrangements for industrial
financing in Nigeria. Finally, in re-designing new institutional arrangements,
strategies to boost production of business enterprises and their capacity to generate
adequate internal funding must be incorporated for effect.
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TABLE I
VOLUME OF CREDIT THROUGH THE BANKING SYSTEM
IN NIGERIA (1981-1997)

YEAR

PERCENTAGE
TOTAL CREDIT CREDIT TO
(N Billion)
MANUFACTURING OF TO.TAL
CREDIT
( N Billion)

1981

16.3

3.0

18.4

1982

21.9

3.4

15.5

1983

28.2

3.6

12.8

1984

31.1

3.6

11.6

1985

32.7

3.8

11.6

1986

36.8

5.5

14.9

1987

41.4

6.6

15.9

1988

57.3

8.0

14.0

1989

49.2

9.2

18.7

1990

57.6

11.0

19.1

1991

83.8

15.4

18.4

1992

142.7

21.2

15.0

1993

271.4

33.6

12.4

1994

350.6

4.9

13.4

1995

394.2

71.7

18.2

1996

216.5

72.2

33.4

1997

268.6

82.8

30.8

Source: (1) CBN Annual Report and Stateme~t of Accounts (Various Issues)
(2) CBN Statistical Bulletin (Various ls!mes)
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TABLE II

..

COMMERCIAL BANKS' LOANS AND ADVANCES TO
MANUFACTURING SECTOR
(Per Cent)

YEAR

I

PRESCRIBED

MONTHLY
AVERAGE
PERFORMANCE
30.5

DEVIATION
FROM TARGET

1982

36.0

1983

36.0

28.4

-7.8

1984

36.0

27.5

-8.5

1985

35.0

26.5

-8.5

1986

34.0

41.6

-2.4

1987

44.0

29.1

-5.9

1988

35.0

30.1

-4.8

1989

35.0

30.l

-4.0

1990

35.0

30.3

-4.7

1991

35.0

36.9

-2.1

1992

35.0

32.5

-2.5

1993

35.0

36.8

1.8

1994

42.0

37.8

-4.2

1995

42.0

40.2

-1.8

1996

42.0

40.5

-1.5

-5.5

Source: CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (Various Issues)
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TABLE III
NIDB SUB- SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF SANCTIONS
( :fl+ million )
:Sub- ~ectors
Food
beverages
Textile

Footwear
Wood Product
Paper Product
Chemical & petroleum products
Rubber
Cement
Glass, Clay and Stone product
Iron and Steel
metal Fabrication
Electronics & Electrical Appliances
Transport & Equipment
Mining and Quarrying
Hotel and Tourism
Miscellaneous
Total

1988
18.2
0
108.6
0
0
0
36.9
0
0
0
0
2.7
3
0
0
0
1.9
171 .3

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

1989

1990

1991

13.7
3.8
4.5
0
0
6
9.1
0
0
0
0
72.6
0
0
5.7
5.1
3
123.5

91.9
55.6
66.1
0
9. 1
54.5
76.8
14.2
0
47.4
0
17. 9
27.1
8
6.6
3,4
157.7
636.3

73.3 254.6 139.2 50.6
5.5
0
9.4
0
104.9
5507 212.9 427.8
0
0 50.8
0
0.7
0 27.8
0
1.8
81.3 83.4
0
172.4 230
265.5
88.4
2.7
0
0
0
34
0
0
0
0
98.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
30.2
33.2
0
0
0
53.9
0
0
10.4
0 26.2
0
8.1
24.7 57.6
0
4.2
0
3
0
42.6
0 77.5
0
543.2 1174.5 1105.6 566.8

Source: CBN Annual Reports

18.8
0
343.5
0
0
0
173.9
0
0
0
0
28.9
0
0
0
0
0
565.1

0
0
0
0
187.2
0
0
163.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
351.0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19.5
0
0
0
0

45
64.5

,
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TABLEIV
NIDB SUB- SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DISBURSEMENTS
( N= million )
Sub- Sectors
Food
beverages
Textile
Footwear
Wood Product & Funiture
Paper Product
'chemical & petroleum products
Rubber
Cement
Glass, Clay and Stone product
Iron and Steel
Metal Fabrication
Electronics & Electrical Appliances
Transport & Equipment
Mining and Quarrying
Hotel and Tourism
Miscellaneous
Total

1990
29.6
3.5
59
0.2
0
10.6
22.7
16.9
0
7. 1
0.1
12.7
26
3.7
0
3.3
25.3
220.6

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

222.2
14.8
479.5
0.1
0
83
180.8
1.9
62.2
0.3
0
71.2
13
5
0.6
4.6
0.4
0
9.2
22.6
155
353.7 1294.2

76.8
8.1
243
0.1
9.3
28.9
174.2
2.6
0
0.5
0
2.3
2.5
30.9
26. l
0.2
29.6
635.1

51.2

78.9
1
33.2
10.5
1.8
0 .2
113.7
0
0
102. l
0
29.l
2.3
0
25.6
0.4
37.2
436

34.9
17.1
637.5
111.3
0.4
0.5
100.5
0
0
2.3
0
16.3
3.4
0
0.5
0
0.7
925.4

5.6
1.4
39.5
16.3
0
21.9
17.7
0
0
1.2·
0
0
1.3
0
0.3
0
0
105.2

4.8
2.3

113.1
7
65
0
8
15.5
43 .1
26.5
24.2
4.7
0.9
10. l
3.4

1.3
44.6
20.3
14.2
13.7
286.6
0
0
14.5
0
31.6
18.3
31.4
19.8
0
65.3
635.l

Source: CBN Annual Reports

I.I
0
0.1
8.6
7.8
0
0
2.3
0
0.4
0.9
0
0. 1
0
56.9
85.3
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TABLE V

The National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND)
Total Number of Projects Approved From Inception To 1998

Year

No. Of Project

Approval (N)

Approval (US$)

1989

5

2,900,040

3,524,436

1990

68

120,181,359

28,150,903

1991

62

170,218,440

16,768,244

1992

31

191,012,000

5,930,518

1993-

67

289,023,000

38,190,851

1994

103

438,848,370

70,992,292

1995

138

260,082,780

123,995,686

1996

54

116,193,735

47,474,285

1997

31

204,748,216

11 ,526,720

1998

2

16,024,000

900,000

Source: NERFUND

0/orumhda

1l

TABLE VI
The National Economic Reconstruction fund (NERFUND)
Total Disbursements (1990-1998)

Year

US$

1990

-

34,648,971.78

1991

-

36,331 ,756.17

N

1992

25,772,688.98

105,618,142.40

1993

20,437,917.56

122,220,318.80

1994

31,515,674.63

97,627,665.92

1995

36,887,213.23

52,402,763.35

1996

13,404,679.00

47,674,027.93

1997

13,796,226.53

80,314,840.47

1998

3,090,000.00

I 04,792,552.00

Sources:. NERFUND
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